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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred upon the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to § 78-2-2(4)
and 78-2a-3(2)(j) of the Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended.
ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

Whether the District Court correctly ruled that the Bennie Creek Road is a public

thoroughfare having been dedicated and abandoned to the use of the public by continuous
use as a public thoroughfare for a period often years. "In deciding whether a road has
been dedicated to public use... a trial court must make initial fact findings and then apply
the law to those fact findings to determine whether they meet statutory guidelines for
public dedication.... [T]his ultimate determination . . . is a mixed question of fact and
law [reviewed] for correctness. Heber City Corp. v. Simpson, 942 P.2d 307, 309 (Utah
1997)(citing State V. Pena, 869 P.2d 932,936 (Utah 1994))... The trial court is granted
significant discretion in its application of the facts to [the law] because its legal
requirements other then the ten year requirement are highly fact dependent and somewhat
amorphous." 942 P.2d 309 (citation omitted). Because the law does not lightly allow the
transfer of property from private to public use, the County bears the burden of proving
dedication to the public by clear and convincing evidence. Draper City v. Estate of
Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097, 1099 (Utah 1995)" Campbell v. Box Elder County, 962 P.2d
806, 807, 808(Utah App 1998).

1

Findings of fact are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. State v. Pena,
869 P.2d 932, 935 (Utah 1994), AWINC Corp, VSimonsen, 2005 UT App 168'f 7. To
find clear error the court "must decide that the factual findings made by the trial court are
not adequately supported by the record, resolving all disputes in the evidence in a light
most favorable to the trial court's determination" Pena, at 935-936. AWINC Corp., \ 7.
The court reviews the application of law for correctness. Pena, at 936, AWINC Corp., ^
7. In reviewing a trial courts determination of the law an appellate court decides the
matter for itself and does not defer in any degree to the trial judge's determination of law.
Id.
2.

The issue before the Appellate Court is whether the trial court erred in denying

Utah County's request to recover $10 for each day the gate remained within the right-ofway after notice was complete, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104(4)(b).
Specifically, this issue is divided into the following sub-issues:
A.

Whether the trial court erred in denying Utah County's request to

recover $10 for each day the gate remained within the right-of-way after
notice was complete, because the trial court incorrectly considered whether
the gate was locked or unlocked, rather than consider the gate, itself as an
"installation" and in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104(4)(b)? The
standard of review for this issue is correctness because this issue is a
question of law. See Allen v. Hall, 107 P.3d 85 (Utah Ct. App. 2005).
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B.

Whether the trial court erred in denying Utah County's request to

recover $10 for each day the gate remained within the right-of-way after
notice was complete, because the evidence in the record demonstrates that
Utah County met its burden of proof on this issue? The standard of review
for this issue is clearly erroneous because this issue is a question of fact.
See State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935 (Utah 1994), AWINC Corp. v.
Simonsen, 2005 UT App 168 \ 7.
DETERMINATIVE LAW
Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104(1), formerly §27-12-89. "A highway is dedicated and
abandoned to the use of the public when it has been continuously used as a public
thoroughfare for a period often years."
UCA § 72-7-104(l)-(7). See Addendum.
Utah County Code § 17-3-l-l(a), (b), (c) See Addendum.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellee Utah County concurs and joins in the Statement of the Case and
Statement of Facts contained in the brief of Appellee Division of Wildlife Resources.
CROSS-APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE
This matter comes before the Appellate Court for a review of the District Court's
denial of Utah County's request for judgment, joint and several, against Randy Butler and
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Donna Butler (hereinafter collectively referred to as the "Butlers") at the rate of $10 per
day from July 29, 1997 to the date of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and
Order [August 16, 2004].
PROCEEDINGS BELOW
After eight days of bench trial, the trial court denied Utah County's request for
judgment, joint and several, against the Butlers at the rate of $10 per day from July 29,
1997 to the date of the Order [August 16,2004] based on the following finding:
That for some of the time since construction of the metal Butler gate in
1997 it has been locked and the Road has been obstructed and for some of
the time it has not. No evidence was presented to clarify how many of the
intervening 2,561 days were days when the Road was obstructed and how
many were not. The Plaintiffs, as the moving party in seeking to obtain the
penalty, had the burden of providing specific evidence of the number of
days the Defendants have been in violation. Merely showing initial service
and testimony that persons were stopped from time to time during the last 6
or 7 years does not meet that burden. Inasmuch as the Court cannot
determine with reasonable precision the number of days during which a
violation of the State statute and County ordinances existed no penalty can
be imposed.
CROSS-APPEAL STATEMENT OF FACTS
Prior to July 29, 1997, the Butlers erected a gate across the Bennie Creek Road.
(R. at 001645:1074-1075). On July 29,1997, the Butlers were served with Notices dated
July 18,1997 which were signed by David J. Gardner, Chairman of the Utah County
Board of Commissioners, directing them to remove the gate from the Bennie Creek Road
(hereinafter referred to as "Road"). (R. at 001645:1147 and Plaintiffs Exhibit Nos. 73
and 74). See Addendum.
4

After the aforementioned Notices were served on the Butlers, they did not remove
the gate from the Road. (R. at 001645:1147). However, the Butlers did unlock the gate
across the Road for approximately 30 days in October of 2001 and again unlocked the
gate from August 20,2002 to October 24, 2002. (R. at 001647: Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 4).
See Addendum. On June 14,2004 during trial, Randy Butler was asked "After you
received that letter [Notice] did you open the gate?" (R. at 001645:1147). Mr. Butler
responded "No

" (R. at 001645:1147). Mr. Butler was then asked "Is the gate still

closed today and locked?" (R. at 001645:1147). Mr. Butler responded "Yeah." (R. at
001645:1147).
At least 23 witnesses testified at trial that a gate was installed on the Road and
locked, which prevented access unless they obtained permission from the Butlers (R. at
001639:19-20, 31, 58, 135, 150-151, 161-162, 165, 167; 001640:203,208-210,218,221,
224,227,237,240,247-248,252,254-255,261,266,279-280,323, 327,379,386-389,
401-402,418,421-422,424; 001641:446-447,462-464,467,478,485, 532, 537-538,
566; 001642:691).
The Butlers offered two items to negate the $10 per day penalty. First, counsel for
the Butlers attempted to introduce into evidence Exhibit No. 83, which was disallowed by
the trial court. (R. at 001645:1122-1130).
However, counsel for the Butlers was successful, by stipulation, in introducing into
evidence Exhibit No. 84 which purports to provide notice of a public hearing held on
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February 11, 2003. (R. at 001645:1126-1128). The "Notice of Public Hearing" provides
"Notice of Intention of the Board of County Commissioners of Utah County, Utah to
Amend the Official Map Ordinance of Utah County, Utah, Part A, by Deleting, Adding,
and Re-aligning Certain Roads and Notice of a Public Hearing to Consider Said
Amendment." As it relates to the Road, the "Notice of Public Hearing" provides "Add to
Bennie Creek Road (from 3523 East 16962 South to 1223 East 16043 South) Sec. 20, 21,
22,26 & 27 T10S R3E." (R. at 001648:84)
Randy Butler testified that he attended the February 11, 2003 Utah County
Commission Meeting and that the Road was discussed. Mr. Butler further testified that
the Road was not designated as a county road at that meeting. (R. at 001645:1127-1128).
During closing argument, counsel for the Butlers commented that "the County to date has
not designated that road as a county road." (R. at 001646:1215).
Contrasted with the testimony of Randy Butler is the testimony of Clyde Naylor.
Mr. Naylor testified that he is the County Engineer, County Surveyor, and Public Works
Director. Mr. Naylor further testified that Utah County has entered into a number of
agreements with the Forest Service for maintenance of the Road (R. at 001639:86-98;
Exhibit Nos. 50, 52-58). These agreements with the Forest Service go back to as early as
January 8,1974. (R. at 001639:86). Mr. Naylor also testified of a number of general
highway maps of Utah County depicting the Road as a class D road. (R. at 001639:98-
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110,114; Exhibit Nos. 60, 62-66). These maps go back to as early as 1955. (R. at
001639:101).
The second item introduced by the Butlers was Exhibit No. 80-C, which is a
picture of a sign. Utah County stipulated that it put the sign on the gate. (R. at
001645:1139-1140; 001648:80-C). The sign reads "Keep Gate Closed Private Property to
Forest Service Boundary No Trespassing Off Road." (R. at 001648:80-C)
During closing argument, the trial court made some very interesting and telling
statements about the $10 a day penalty. The trial court commented that "Your client was
served on the 29th of July, 1997. The road has remained obstructed from then until now.
Just totaling it up it's something like 2,300 days. We're talking $23,400 or something. I
mean that's - and that's not counting the present year." (R. at 001646:1214). The trial
court also stated that "the only testimony I have is that from '96 on the gate was locked. I
know from having supervised this case for a little while that there was a period of time by
consent when the gate wasn't locked and then it was locked again. I don't know. But
none of that testimony was presented at trial, so let's stick to the evidence that I heard at
trial." (R. at 001646:1219).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
APPEAL
1.

Defendants argue for the first time on appeal that trespassers are not members of

the public for the purpose of dedication of a road by use. By failing to raise and preserve
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the issue in the trial court, Defendants are now barred from raising it on appeal for the
first time. Defendants' did not put the trial court on notice of the newly asserted trespass
argument, preventing the trial court from addressing and ruling on the issue. The
trespass issue was not sufficiently raised to a level of consciousness before the trial court
or supported by evidence or relevant legal authority. This prevented the trial court from
making findings of fact or conclusions of law on the issue.
Plain error does not exist in this instance to allow the court to address Defendants'
trespass argument on appeal. Any alleged error in this case cannot be plain error as the
law governing the error was not clear at the time the alleged error was made. No
dispositive appellate case has been decided on this issue and there is no settled appellate
law to guide the trial court.
Defendants also cannot demonstrate that an error, if any was committed, was
harmful or of such a magnitude that there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable
outcome for the Defendants as Defendants claim only seven of Plaintiffs' 48 witnesses
were trespassers.
Nor are there any exceptional circumstances which would justify considering
Defendants' trespass arguments for the first time on appeal. Defendants do not claim any
rare procedural anomalies or unusual circumstances which would result in manifest
injustice. Nor did manifest injustice occur in light of the overwhelming evidence that the
Bennie Creek road is a public road.
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The foregoing arguments are equally applicable to Defendants' claim that by
refusing to apply common law trespassing principles to the requisite elements of
dedication, the trial court impermissibly relieved Plaintiffs of their burden to prove
dedication by clear and convincing evidence and thereby shifted the burden to Defendants
to prove otherwise. This argument was not raised below and should not be considered
now for the same reasons as are stated above.
2.

Defendants' first argument is that the Court erred by determining that Plaintiffs' 48

witnesses spanning public use from the late 1920!s to 1997 were members of the public
because they were trespassers. Defendants have failed to marshal the evidence in support
of the trial court's finding that the witnesses were members of the public or the court's
finding that no trespassing signs posted private property along the Bennie Creek road but
not the road itself. Defendants fail to marshall any of the testimony of 41 of Plaintiffs'
witnesses, several maps (dating from 1955) and other exhibits in evidence showing the
Bennie Creek road as a public road. Plaintiffs' evidence, when viewed in the light most
favorable to the trial court's decision, establishes that Plaintiffs' witnesses were lawfully
using a public thoroughfare.
Despite the fact that Plaintiffs presented evidence of uninterrupted public use from
the 1920?s by 48 witnesses, and 75 exhibits including 48 photos, Defendants claim that
there was no evidence to marshal in support of the trial court's finding of continuous use.
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Defendants do nothing more than re-argue Defendants' witnesses' testimony which was
discredited in the trial court's Memorandum Decision.
In the face of evidence of continuous uninterrupted public use from the 1920fs
through 1997, Defendants also complain that a specific ten year time period before 1958
or after the early 60fs was not identified, yet fail to marshall any evidence which would
support a finding of continuous use. To attack this finding the Defendants are required
and have failed to marshal the evidence to show that there is no evidence before or after
the identified time periods which would support a finding of continuous public use for
any ten year period.
Defendants failed to provide a list of evidence supporting the factual findings of
the trial court and also failed to point out any fatal flaws in the evidence. In this case
Defendants' failure to marshal results in the assumption that the record supports the
findings of the trial court. Defendants do nothing more than re-argue the facts which the
trial court determined were not credible as outlined in the trial court's Memorandum
Decision. Because Defendants failed to marshall the evidence, Defendants' appeal
should be dismissed.
3.

Defendants Butler and Evans did not allege Plaintiffs' witnesses were trespassers

in their Answer to the Complaint or Amended Complaint as required by the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure. Defendants, by failing to assert the trespass arguments in the Answer to
the Amended Complaint waived this defense. Further, even if not waived, Defendants
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carry the burden of establishing the claimed trespass arguments as an affirmative defense
and failed to do so. Requiring a party to establish his own case does not shift the burden
of proof.
4.

Defendants' arguments in LC. of Appellants' Brief contain conclusory statements

without any supporting case law or analysis and are so inadequately briefed that the court
should not consider these arguments. The cases cited in support of the contention that
Plaintiffs had the burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that those traveling
the Bennie Creek Road were not trespassers did not address the argument.
Defendants' trespass argument is also not relevant as the courts have ruled that
consent of the land owner is not a relevant issue to dedication of a public thoroughfare.
What is consistent with the ruling that land owner consent is not relevant is that common
law trespass does qualify as use within the meaning of the dedication by use statute.
Defendants do not allege any no trespassing signs prior to the late 1950fs or early
1960fs, leaving 30 years of public use of the Bennie Creek road before landowners posted
the property adjacent to the road. The public did not trespass when traveling the Bennie
Creek road which was already established by use. If property owners wrongfully placed
gates across the Bennie Creek road and posted no trespassing signs in the late 50fs or
early 60fs, it was long after dedication by public use.
5.

Utah statutes establish the laws of the State of Utah respecting the subjects to

which they relate and their provisions and all proceedings under them are to be liberally
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construed with a view to effect the objects of the statutes and to promote justice. UCA
68-3-2. Section 72-5-104 and it's predecessor are to be liberally construed to effect the
objects of the statute. Rather than being modified by common law trespass, the
dedication by use statute modifies common law trespass. Following Defendants' logic,
anyone who physically invaded the land of another are not members of the public for the
purpose of dedication by use, rendering the public dedication statute meaningless thereby
prohibiting 72-5-104 from being liberally construed with the view to effect the objects of
the statute. Physical invasion of a public thoroughfare is an essential element of the
public dedication statute. Common law trespass principles have no application to this
case.
CROSS APPEAL
6.

The cross-appeal is a review of the trial court's decision denying Utah County's

request to recover $10 for each day the gate remained within the right-of-way after notice
was complete, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104(4)(b). The trial court erred
because it incorrectly considered whether the gate was locked or unlocked, rather than
consider the gate, itself as an "installation" and in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 72-7104(4)(b). The term "installation" in Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104(4)(b) although not
defined is broad enough to contemplate gates, locked or not, installed within right-ofways. In this case, the Butler erected a gate across the Road and were served with
Notices to remove the gate. It is undisputed that the Butler did not remove the gate.
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Furthermore, there is no evidence that the Butlers ever sought or obtained permission
from the Utah County Commission to erect a gate across the Road, locked or not. As a
result, the gate was improperly erected across the Road and Utah County is entitled to the
$10 a day penalty.
7.

Even if the trial court properly considered whether the gate was locked or

unlocked, the evidence at trial shows the gate was locked and demonstrates with
reasonable precision how many days the gate was locked. There is little doubt that the
underlying burden of proof on whether the Road has been dedicated and abandoned to the
use of the public was by clear and convincing. However, there is also little doubt that the
standard of proof as to Utah County request to recover the $10 a day penalty was
preponderance of the evidence.
The evidence produced at trial was that the Butlers erected a gate across the Road
and were served with Notices to remove the gate on July 29,1997. The Butlers, after
being served with the Notices, did not remove the gate from the Road. Furthermore,
Randy Butler testified that after being served the Notice that he did open the gate and that
the gate was still closed and locked as of the day he testified. Also, at least 23 witnesses
testified at trial that a gate was installed on the Road and locked, which prevented access
unless they obtained permission from the Butlers. The trial court even commented during
closing argument that "Your client was served on the 29th of July, 1997. The road has
remained obstructed from then until now. Just totaling it up it's something like 2,300
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days. We're talking $23,400 or something. I mean that's - and that's not counting the
present year." (R. at 001646:1214). Later during closing argument, the trial court stated
that "the only testimony I have is that from '96 on the gate was locked. I know from
having supervised this case for a little while that there was a period of time by consent
when the gate wasn't locked and then it was locked again. I don't know. But none of
that testimony was presented at trial, so let's stick to the evidence that I heard at trial."
(R. at 001646:1219). From the evidence produced at trial, it is clear that Utah County met
its burden of proof that the gate on the Road was locked from July 29, 1997 through trial.
The trial court even so commented.
Once Utah County met its burden of producing evidence to demonstrate that the
gate on the Road was locked from July 29, 1997 through trial, then it became the Butlers'
burden of producing mitigating evidence as to which days the gate was unlocked. The
Butlers failed in this regard.
To determine with reasonable precision the days the gate was unlocked, the trial
court could have considered the entire record contained a letter from Randy Butler to
former Utah County Commissioner Gary L. Herbert, dated December 9, 2002. In that
letter, Mr. Butler clearly sets forth the periods of time when the gate was unlocked, which
consisted of approximately 30 days in October 2001 and from August 20, 2002 to
October 24,2002 (66 days), for a total of 96 days. There is no additional evidence that
the gate across the Road was ever unlocked.
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Finally, the two items introduced by the Butlers consisting of a "Notice of Public
Hearing" and a sign placed on the gate were deficient to negate the $10 per day penalty.
ARGUMENT
I.

DEFENDANTS HAVE WAIVED THEIR TRESPASS ARGUMENTS BY
FAILING TO RAISE THEM BELOW
A. Defendants Did Not Preserve Their Trespass Arguments Below.
Defendants claim for the first time on appeal that trespassers do not constitute

members of the public under U.C.A § 72-5-104. Defendants further claim the following
argument of Defendants' counsel preserved the issue.
What happened to the gate, like I say we know...we don't know
exactly when, we just know it was after 1986. We have photographs of
this. We have photographs that the last person to travel this road was a
trespasser. Sometime after 1986 this traveler encountered the gate and
found it locked. In all probability it was locked with a chain and a padlock
attached to the north side of the road. Law abiding citizens at that point in
time would have stopped and gone back, sought permission or quietly gone
home. Instead this person cut the gate and trespassed onto private ground.
That person may or may not have testified in this case, your honor, but the
fact remains that he was not law abiding. To allow him or others like him
to establish rights of the public by trespassing does not do this country
justice. In fact it would be a travesty.
Chief Justice, excuse me, Supreme Court Justice Scalia in his case,
which I am sure the court is familiar with, the South Carolina Coastal
Commission case said that Americans have property rights. These rights
are essential to a free country, and these rights of ownership are far superior
to the rights of the general public.
He likened these rights, your honor, into a bundle of sticks and said
clearly that one of those sticks...albeit one of those rights was the right to
keep people off of your property. This right is fundamental and it would be
our solemn duty as attorneys in the court to protect that right.
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To that end the State of Utah has enacted both legislation and it's
case laws supporting private property ownership. Those laws make it a
crime to trespass.
In particular, your honor, under Title 23 the law is such that if you
are going across property which is irrigated or pastured property to hunt,
and you must seek written permission from one property owner so long as
it's posted. That law was enacted first in 1971. Also, these courts have
protected that personal property right by making the burden of proof in this
case clear and convincing...
As I see it, your honor, before the public can take property without
compensating the owners, it must establish that it was abandoned by clear
and convincing evidence. The courts say what that means is that the
evidence must be unequivocal. There have been no silver bullets in this
case, your honor. There has not been overwhelming unequivocal clear and
convincing evidence that these public people, if they were part of the
public, have been able to travel that road whenever they saw fit, convenient
or otherwise. R1646, pp. 1197-1199.
This closing argument did not raise or preserve for appeal the proposition argued
for the first time on appeal by Defendants, that trespassers are not members of the public
for the purpose of dedication of a road by use. During trial or in closing arguments
Defendants did not identify one Plaintiffs' witness that Defendants claim was a trespasser
and not a member of the public. In the quoted passage Defendants reference criminal
trespass, not common law trespass argued for the first time in Defendants' brief.
Highlighting the fact that Defendants did not raise this issue is the fact that the trial court
did not address Defendants' trespass argument in the Memorandum Decision. If this
issue had been raised the District Court would have addressed it in it's thoughtful and
detailed Memorandum Decision. By failing to raise and preserve the issue in the trial
court, Defendants are now barred from raising it on appeal for the first time.
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[I]n general appellate courts will not consider an issue including
constitutional arguments raised for the first time on appeal unless the trial court
committed plain error or the case involves exceptional circumstances... A proper
objection "puts the judge on notice of the asserted error and allows the opportunity
for correction at that time in the course of the proceeding"... Moreover, the issue
must be sufficiently raised to a level of consciousness before the trial court and
must be supported by evidence or relevant legal authority... Failure to raise and
argue an issue and present pertinent evidence in that forum denies the trial court
"the opportunity to make any findings of fact or conclusions of law" concerning
the claimed error. State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, \ 13. (citations omitted).
Defendants' argument at trial did not put the trial court on notice of the newly
asserted trespass argument, preventing the trial court from addressing and ruling on the
issue. The belatedly raised trespass issue was not sufficiently raised to a level of
consciousness before the trial court or supported by evidence or relevant legal authority.
This prevented the trial court from making findings of fact or conclusions of law on the
issue. Defendants' quoted closing arguments failed to put the trial court on notice of the
argument and failed to sufficiently bring the issue to the courts attention. See Id. ^f 14.
B. The Trial Court Did Not Commit Plain Error.
Plain error does not exist in this instance to allow the court to address Defendants'
trespass argument on appeal. To demonstrate plain error Defendants must establish that
(I) an error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the
error is harmful, (i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more
favorable outcome for the appellant. Id. \ 15. (Citations omitted). Any alleged error in
this case cannot be plain error as the law governing the error was not clear at the time the
alleged error was made. See Id. ^ 16. No dispositive appellate case has been decided on
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this issue and there is no settled appellate law to guide the trial court. See Id. In fact
there is no case law dealing with this issue. The law in this area is not sufficiently clear
or plainly settled. See Id \ 18. If an error was made it was not obvious at the time the
court entered it's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order.
Defendants also cannot demonstrate that an error, if any was committed, was
harmful or of such a magnitude that there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable
outcome for the Defendants as Defendants claim only seven of Plaintiffs' 48 witnesses
were trespassers.

Id\22.

C. There Are No Exceptional Circumstances Which Would Allow Consideration
Of Defendants'Trespass Arguments.
Nor are there any exceptional circumstances which would justify considering
Defendants' trespass arguments for the first time on appeal. The extraordinary
circumstances doctrine applies only to rare procedural anomalies. The exception is
applied sparingly, reserved only for the most unusual circumstances where the appellate
court's failure to consider an issue that was not properly preserved for appeal would have
resulted in manifest injustice. The extraordinary circumstances exception is a safety
device against such injustice. State v. Nelson-Waggoner 2004 Utah 29, \ 23. Defendants
do not claim any rare procedural anomalies or unusual circumstances which would result
in manifest injustice. Nor did manifest injustice occur in light of the overwhelming
evidence that the Bennie Creek road is a public road.
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The foregoing arguments are equally applicable to Defendants' claim that by
refusing to apply common law trespassing principles to the requisite elements of
dedication, the trial court impermissibly relieved Plaintiffs of their burden to prove
dedication by clear and convincing evidence and thereby shifted the burden to Defendants
to prove otherwise. This argument was simply not raised below and should not be
considered now for the same reasons as are stated above.
As Defendants did not properly raise their trespass arguments below, the court
should not consider these arguments.
II.

DEFENDANTS HAVE FAILED TO MARSHALL THE EVIDENCE IN THIS
CASE.
Defendants' first argument is that the Court erred by determining that Plaintiffs' 48

witnesses spanning public use from the late 1920fs to 1997 were members of the public
because they were trespassers. Besides having failed to raise or preserve this issue below,
Defendants have failed to marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's finding that
the witnesses were members of the public or the court's finding that no trespassing signs
posted private property along the Bennie Creek road but not the road itself. (R. 1465, 66)
In support of their argument, Defendants' reference seven of Plaintiffs' witnesses who
testified that the trespassing signs they observed posted property along the Bennie Creek
road but not the road; (2) cite that trespassing signs were only seen after 1984; (3) refer to
a wire gate across the road which was not locked which said "Please Close Gate" and (4)
point out that Mr. Butler called the Sheriff after 1987 to remove trespassers from his
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property (not the road). App. Br., p. 21. Defendants fail to marshall any of the testimony
of Plaintiffs' remaining 41 witnesses and several maps and exhibits in evidence showing
the Bennie Creek road as a public road dating from as early as 1955. This evidence, plus
the evidence cited by Defendants when viewed in the light most favorable to the trial
court's decision, establish that Plaintiffs' witnesses were lawfully using a public
thoroughfare and saw signs posting property adjacent to the Bennie Creek road. The trial
court determined that the use of the Bennie Creek road by Plaintiffs' witnesses for 70
years was use of the public under the public dedication statute.
Defendants' second argument attacks the trial court's finding that the Bennie
Creek Road was used continuously by the public as the use did not occur as often as the
public had occasion or chose to pass. Despite the fact that Plaintiffs presented evidence
of uninterrupted public use from the 1920's by 48 witnesses, and 75 exhibits including 48
photos, Defendants claim that there was no evidence to marshal in support of the trial
court's finding of continuous use. Defendants do nothing more than re-argue Defendants'
witnesses' testimony which was discredited in the trial court's Memorandum Decision.
See R. 1463-1470.
In addition to other findings on continuous use, the trial court found that ten
witnesses personally used the road for recreation in the 1940's and 50fs, none encountered
locked gates, sought permission or were prevented from traveling the road and drove
vehicles well into Forest Service property. R. 1470. A 1949 aerial photograph showed

20

the road extending from U.S. Highway 89 into the vicinity of the National Forest and all
of Mr. Butler's predecessors in interest from 1927-1963 (Madge Truman, Virginia
Johnson, Shirlene Ottesen) testified the road was traveled often by the public and no
attempts were made to restrict or deny public access to the road. R 1471.
In Defendants' third argument, in the face of evidence of continuous uninterrupted
public use from the 1920?s through 1997, Defendants complain that a specific ten year
time period before 1958 or after the early 60fs was not identified, yet fail to marshall any
evidence which would support a finding of continuous use. To attack this finding the
Defendants are required and have failed to marshal the evidence to show that there is no
evidence before or after the identified time periods which would support a finding of
continuous public use for ten years. As any ten year period between 1920 and 1997 will
support the trial court's decision, Defendants were required to marshall and show that
there was no ten year period of public use.
The Defendants failure to marshal any evidence in support of the trial court's
findings is highlighted by the fact that Defendants' Statement of the Case and Statement
of Facts are almost identical, commencing not with the facts relevant to this case, but with
Plaintiffs filing this action and detailing procedural matters concluding with Plaintiffs
Notice of Cross Appeal. App. Br., pp. 10-17.
To challenge factual findings one "must marshal the evidence in support of the
findings and then demonstrate that despite this evidence the trial court's findings are not
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supported by clear and convincing evidence." Young v. Young, 1999 UT38 15, 979 P.2d
238 (quoting In Re State ofBartell 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989)(citations omitted.)).
To properly marshal the evidence [one] must first list all of the evidence supporting the
challenged finding. See, e.g., Tingey v. Christensen, 1999 UT 68, f7; 987 P.2d 588. [A
party] must then show that the marshaled evidence is legally insufficient to support the
findings when viewing the evidence and inferences in a light most favorable to the
decision. See Id

To properly marshal the evidence one must 'show that the findings

are not supported by clear and convincing evidence... [and]... in comprehensive and
fastidious order, [present] every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which
supports the very findings the appellant resists. West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818
P.2d 1311,1315 (Utah App. 1991) emphasis added. AWINC CORP., Tf9, 10.
Despite challenging the trial courts findings, Defendants failed to provide a list of
evidence supporting the factual findings of the trial court. See Id., ^|10. Defendants not
only failed to provide a comprehensive list of evidence but also failed to point out any
fatal flaws in the evidence. Id. In this case Defendants' failure to marshal results in the
assumption that the record supports the findings of the trial court. Id.
Defendants do nothing more then re-argue the facts which the trial court
determined were not credible as outlined in the trial court's Memorandum Decision.
When a party fails to marshal the evidence supporting a challenged fact finding, [the
court] reject[s] the challenge as "nothing more then an attempt to re-argue the case before
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[the appellate] court." Promax Dev, Corp. v. Madsen, 943 P.2d 247, 255 (Utah Court
App. 1997), cert denied 943 P.2d 247 (Utah 1997), Campbell at 808. Because
Defendants failed to marshall the evidence, Defendants' appeal should be dismissed.
III.

IF RELEVANT AND NOT WAIVED, PROOF THAT PLAINTIFFS'
WITNESSES WERE TRESPASSERS IS AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE ON
WHICH DEFENDANTS HAVE THE BURDEN OF PROOF.
Defendants did not allege Plaintiffs' witnesses were trespassers in their Answer to

the Complaint or Amended Complaint as required by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
R. 277, 130. The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure require a party to state in short and plain
terms his defenses to each claim asserted. URCP 8(b). A party is further required to set
forth affirmatively any matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense. URCP
8(c). Every defense in law or fact to a claim for relief in any pleading shall be asserted in
the responsive pleading thereto if one is required. URCP 12(b). A party waives all
defenses and objections not presented either by motion or by answer or reply. URCP
12(h). Defendants, by failing to assert the trespass arguments in the Answer to the
Amended Complaint waived this defense.
Further, even if not waived, Defendants carry the burden of establishing the
claimed trespass arguments as an affirmative defense and failed to do so. Requiring a
party to establish his own case does not shift the burden of proof. Affirmative defenses
require the party asserting it to meet the burden of proof as to every necessary element.
Messickv. PHD Trucking Services, Inc., 615 P.2d 1276, 1277 (Utah 1980).
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IV.

DEFENDANTS' ARGUMENT THAT PLAINTIFFS CARRIED THE BURDEN
OF PROOF TO SHOW THEIR WITNESS WERE NOT TRESPASSERS IS
MERITLESS
A. Defendants' Arguments Are Inadequately Briefed.
Arguments that contain no meaningful analysis are inadequately briefed and

should not be considered. See Bernat v. Allphin 2005 UT1, ^ 38, 106P3rd 707.
Defendants' arguments in I.C. of Appellants' Brief contain conclusory statements without
any supporting case law or analysis and are so inadequately briefed that the court should
not consider these arguments. The cases cited in support of the contention that Plaintiffs
had the burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that those traveling the Bennie
Creek Road were not trespassers did not address the argument. The contention that the
trial court impermissibly relieved Plaintiffs of their burden to prove dedication by clear
and convincing evidence by not applying common law trespass principles is not supported
by case law and is lacking any legal argument or analysis. Defendants' arguments in
section IC of their brief are bald assertions without legal support or analysis and should
be rejected.
B. Whether Members of the Public Are Trespassers Is Not Relevant.
Defendants' trespass argument is also not relevant as the courts have ruled that
consent of the land owner is not a relevant issue to dedication of a public thoroughfare.
Heber City Corp. V. Simpson, 942 P.2d 307, 31 l(Utah 1997). What is consistent with the
ruling that land owner consent is not relevant is that common law trespass does qualify as
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use within the meaning of the dedication by use statute. Since owner intent is irrelevant,
whether the road was posted or whether any of those using the road were common law
trespassers is not relevant. The only issue addressed in the cases cited by Defendants is
whether the use was permissive which Defendants have not asserted.
In fact the public did not trespass when traveling the Bennie Creek road which was
already established by use. If property owners wrongfully placed gates across the Bennie
Creek road and posted no trespassing signs in the late 50fs or early 60fs, it was long after
dedication by public use. However, as found by the trial court, posted signs prevented
travel off the road and gates were placed to control stock and not restrict road access.
C. Defendants' Trespass Argument is Fatally Flawed.
Even if Defendants' arguments regarding trespass were relevant or properly raised,
Defendants do not allege any no trespassing signs prior to the late 1950!s or early 1960fs,
leaving 30 years of public use of the Bennie Creek road before landowners posted the
property adjacent to the road. Taking the converse of Defendants' arguments, if seven
individuals were trespassers because they saw trespass signs and their use could not be
public use because they were common law trespassers, the use of the road from the 1920fs
to the late 1950fs or early 1960fs would then be public use as the property was not posted
no trespassing.
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V.

UCA 72-5-104 IS NOT SUBJECT TO COMMON LAW TRESPASS
PRINCIPLES.
At statehood the common law of England so far as it was not repugnant to or in

conflict with the constitution or laws of the State of Utah was adopted. UCA 68-3-1.
However, the rule of the common law that statutes in derogation of the common law are
to be strictly construed has no application to the statutes of Utah. Utah statutes establish
the laws of the State of Utah respecting the subjects to which they relate and their
provisions and all proceedings under them are to be liberally construed with a view to
effect the objects of the statutes and to promote justice. UCA 68-3-2. As recognized by
the trial court, UCA 72-5-104 formerly UCA 27-12-89 has remained substantially
unchanged since first enacted by the territorial legislature in 1886. Lindsay Landon
Livestock Co. v. Churnos 75 Utah 384, 285 P.2d 646, 648 (Utah 1929). R 1473.
Section 72-5-104 and it's predecessor are to be liberally construed to effect the
objects of the statute. This statute is not subject to the common law, but the common law
is subject to it. Rather than being modified by common law trespass, the dedication by
use statute modifies common law trespass.
Use of the Bennie Creek road as a public thoroughfare for a period often years is
the question before the court, not whether the public were trespassers. Following
Defendants' logic anyone who physically invaded the land of another are not members of
the public for the purpose of dedication by use, rendering the public dedication statute
meaningless thereby prohibiting 72-5-104 from being liberally construed with the view to
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effect the objects of the statute. UCA 68-3-2. To adopt Defendants' argument would
mean that no one could be a member of the public under the public dedication statute as
the courts have previously determined that permissive use of a thoroughfare cannot ripen
into a public way. To the contrary, physical invasion of a public thoroughfare is an
essential element of the public dedication statute. Utah state statutes have modified the
common law. Common law trespass principles have no application to this case.
VI.

STATEMENT REGARDING DIVISION OF WILDLIFE RESOURCES BRIEF.
Appellee Utah County adopts, joins in and concurs with all arguments and sections

of the Appellee Division of Wildlife Resources brief filed in this matter.
CROSS-APPEAL ARGUMENT
This cross-appeal is a review of the trial court's decision denying Utah County's
request to recover $10 for each day the gate remained within the right-of-way after notice
was complete, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104(4)(b). The trial court erred
because it incorrectly considered whether the gate was locked or unlocked, rather than
consider the gate, itself as an "installation" and in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 72-7104(4)(b). Also, even if the trial court properly considered whether the gate was locked
or unlocked, the evidence at trial shows the gate was locked and demonstrates with
reasonable precision how many days the gate was locked. Therefore, the trial court's
decision as to whether Utah County is entitled to recover $10 for each day the gate
remained within the right-of-way after notice was complete should be reversed and Utah
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County should be granted judgment in the amount of $10 for each day the gate remained
within the right-of-way after notice was complete from July 29, 1997 to August 16, 2004
[the date of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order] for a total of 2,574 days
and $25,740.00.
VII.

THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY CONSIDERED WHETHER THE GATE
WAS LOCKED OR UNLOCKED, RATHER THAN CONSIDER THE GATE,
ITSELF AS AN "INSTALLATION" AND IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE
ANN. § 72-7-104(4)(B).
The trial court incorrectly considered whether the gate was locked or unlocked,

rather than consider the gate, itself as an "installation" and in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 72-7-104(4)(b). This is an issue of law of reviewed for correctness. See Allen v. Hall,
107 P.3d 85 (Utah Ct. App. 2005). Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104(4)(B) provides that a
"highway authority may recover $10 for each day the installation remained within the
right-of-way after notice was complete." (emphasis added). The term "installation" is
not defined in the Protection of Highways Act, Chapter 7 of Title 72 of the Utah Code.
However, Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104(1) provides some insight as to the meaning
of the term "installation" and states as follows:
If any person, firm, or corporation installs, places, constructs, alters, repairs,
or maintains any approach road, driveway, pole, pipeline, conduit, sewer,
ditch, culvert, outdoor advertising sign, or any other structure or object of
any kind or character within the right-of-way of any highway without
complying with this title, the highway authority having jurisdiction over the
right-of-way may:
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(a) remove the installation from the right-of-way or require the person, firm,
or corporation to remove the installation; or
(b) give written notice to the person, firm, or corporation to remove the
installation from the right-of-way.
The above subsection is all encompassing and certainly contemplates gates, locked or not,
installed within right-of-ways. Likewise, the term "installation" in Utah Code Ann. § 727-104(4)(b) would also contemplate gates, locked or not, installed within right-of-ways.
In this case, Randy Butler admits that prior to July 29, 1997, the Butlers erected a
gate across the Road. (R. at 001645:1074-1075). Mr. Butler also admits that he and his
wife, Donna Butler were served on July 29, 1997 with Notices dated July 18,1997 and
signed by David J. Gardner, Chairman of the Utah County Board of Commissioners,
directing them to remove the gate from the Road. (R. at 001645:1147 and Plaintiffs
Exhibit Nos. 73 and 74.) See Addendum.
At trial on June 14, 2004, Randy Butler was asked "After you received that letter
[Notice] did you open the gate?" (R. at 001645:1147). Mr. Butler responded " N o . . . . "
(R. at 001645:1147). Mr. Butler was then asked "Is the gate still closed today and
locked?" (R. at 001645:1147). Mr. Butler responded "Yeah." (R. at 001645:1147).
During closing argument, the trial court commented that "Your client was served on the
29th of July, 1997. The road has remained obstructed from then until now." (R. at
001646:1214). It is undisputed that after the aforementioned Notices were served on the
Butlers, they did not remove the gate from the Road.
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A "gate is not allowed on a county road unless authorized by the county executive
in accordance with the provisions of this section [Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-106]." Utah
Code Ann § 72-7-106(5)(a). In other words, a person seeking to install a gate in a rightof-way must comply with Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-106 by seeking and obtaining the
permission of the county executive. There is no evidence that the Butlers ever sought or
obtained permission from the Utah County Commission to erect a gate across the Road,
locked or not. It is interesting to note that nowhere in the Protection of Highways Act,
Chapter 7 of Title 72 of the Utah Code does it provide for the locking of gates on county
roads. Even if we assume that permission was obtained to erect a gate across the Road,
that permission would certainly have been terminated by the serving of the
aforementioned Notices on the Butlers, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-106(5)(b).
The trial court incorrectly considered whether the gate erected across the Road by
the Butlers was locked or unlocked, rather than consider the gate, itself as an
"installation" and in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104(4)(b). As a result, this
decision of the trial court should be reversed and Utah County should be granted
judgment in the amount of $10 for each day the gate remained within the right-of-way
after notice was complete from July 29,1997 to August 16,2004 [the date of the Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order] for a total of 2,574 days and $25,740.00.
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VIII. THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY DETERMINED AGAINST THE
WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE, THAT IT COULD NOT DETERMINE WITH
REASONABLE PRECISION THE NUMBER OF DAYS THAT THE GATE
WAS LOCKED IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 72-7-104(4)(b).
Assuming the trial court correctly focused on whether the gate was locked or
unlocked, rather than consider the gate, itself as an "installation" and in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 72-7-104(4)(b), the evidence in the record demonstrates that Utah County
met its burden of proof on this issue.
A.

The Underlying Burden of Proof on Whether Utah County Is Entitled to
Recover $10 for Each Day the Gate Remained Within the Right-of-way
after Notice Was Complete Was Preponderance of the Evidence.

There is little doubt that the underlying burden of proof on whether the Road has
been dedicated and abandoned to the use of the public was by clear and convincing
evidence. See Draper City v. Estate of Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097, 1099 (Utah 1995).
However, "there is similarly little doubt that the standard of proof generally applied in
civil proceedings is the preponderance of the evidence standard." See Hansen v. Hansen,
958 P.2d 931, 935-6 (Utah Ct. App 1998) {citing Johns v. Shulsen, 111 P.2d 1336, 1338
(Utah 1986) ("It is universally recognized that the standard of proof in civil actions is by a
preponderance of the evidence."); Lipman v. Industrial Comm'n, 592 P.2d 616, 618
(Utah 1979) (noting preponderance is "usual standard of proof... used in most civil
actions"); Morris v. Farmers Home Mut. Ins, Co., 28 Utah 2d 206, 500 P.2d 505, 507
(1972) (stating preponderance is "universally recognized standard of proof required to
establish facts in a civil case")). This usual standard of proof of a preponderance of
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evidence applies to Utah County's request to recover $10 for each day the gate remained
within the right-of-way after notice was complete, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 72-7104(4)(b).
B.

The Evidence Produced at Trial Was That Gate Remained Within the Rightof-way and Locked after Notice Was Complete and Throughout the Trial.

The evidence produced at trial was that prior to July 29, 1997, the Butlers erected a
gate across the Road. (R. at 001645:1074-1075). On July 29,1997, the Butlers were
served with Notices dated July 18,1997 and signed by David J. Gardner, Chairman of the
Utah County Board of Commissioners, directing them to remove the gate from the Road.
(R. at 001645:1147 and Plaintiff s Exhibit Nos. 73 and 74.) See Addendum.
After the aforementioned Notices were served on the Butlers, they did not remove
the gate from the Road. (R. at 001645:1147). On June 14, 2004 during trial, Randy
Butler was asked "After you received that letter [Notice] did you open the gate?" (R. at
001645:1147). Mr. Butler responded " N o . . . . " (R. at 001645:1147). Mr. Butler was
then asked "Is the gate still closed today and locked?" (R. at 001645:1147). Mr. Butler
responded "Yeah." (R. at 001645:1147).
At least 23 witnesses testified at trial that a gate was installed on the Road and
locked, which prevented access unless they obtained permission from the Butlers (R. at
001639:19-20, 31, 58,135, 150-151, 161-162,165,167; 001640:203, 208-210,218,221,
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224, 227, 237, 240, 247-248, 252, 254-255, 261, 266,279-280, 323, 327, 379, 386-389,
401-402, 418, 421-422, 424; 001641:446-447, 462-464, 467,478, 485, 532, 537-538,
566; 001642:691).
During closing argument, the trial court commented that "Your client was served
on the 29th of July, 1997. The road has remained obstructed from then until now. Just
totaling it up it's something like 2,300 days. We're talking $23,400 or something. I mean
that's - and that's not counting the present year." (R. at 001646:1214). Later during
closing argument, the trial court stated that "the only testimony I have is that from '96 on
the gate was locked. I know from having supervised this case for a little while that there
was a period of time by consent when the gate wasn't locked and then it was locked
again. I don't know. But none of that testimony was presented at trial, so let's stick to
the evidence that I heard at trial."

(R. at 001646:1219).

From the above evidence, it is clear that Utah County met its burden of proof that
the gate on the Road was locked from July 29, 1997 through trial. The trial court even so
commented. Based on the evidence presented at trial, the gate was locked and not opened
warranting judgment for $10 per day from service of the notice until entry of the final
order.
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C.

Once Utah County Met its Burden of Producing Evidence to Demonstrate
That the Gate on the Road Was Locked from July 29, 1997 Through Trial,
Then it Became the Butlers' Burden of Proving Which Days the Gate Was
Unlocked.

Generally, "the proponent of a proposition has two burdens relative to his proof: to
produce evidence which proves or tends to prove the proposition asserted; and to
persuade the trier of fact that his evidence is more credible or entitled to the greater
weight. Once the proponent has produced such evidence, the burden of producing
evidence disproving or tending to disprove the proposition shifts to the opponent, and he
must introduce such evidence as may be necessary to avoid the risk of a directed verdict
or a peremptory finding against him as to the existence of the proposition." See Koesling
v. Basamakis, 539 P.2d 1043, 1046 (Utah 1975). Here, once Utah County met its burden
of producing evidence to demonstrate that the gate on the Road was locked from July 29,
1997 through trial, then it became the Butlers' burden of producing mitigating evidence
as to which days the gate was unlocked. The Butlers failed in this regard.
Utah County met its burden of production during the examination of Randy Butler
when he was asked "After you received that letter [Notice] did you open the gate?" (R. at
001645:1147). Mr. Butler responded " N o . . . . " (R. at 001645:1147). Mr. Butler was
then asked "Is the gate still closed today and locked?" (R. at 001645:1147). Mr. Butler
responded "Yeah." (R. at 001645:1147).
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Also, as previously cited, supra page 32, 33, at least 23 witnesses testified at trial
that a gate was installed on the Road and locked, which prevented access unless they
obtained permission from the Butlers.
Furthermore, during closing argument, the trial court commented that "Your client
was served on the 29th of July, 1997. The road has remained obstructed from then until
now. Just totaling it up it's something like 2,300 days. We're talking $23,400 or
something. I mean that's - and that's not counting the present year." (R. at
001646:1214). Later during closing argument, the trial court stated that "the only
testimony I have is that from '96 on the gate was locked. I know from having supervised
this case for a little while that there was a period of time by consent when the gate wasn't
locked and then it was locked again. I don't know. But none of that testimony was
presented at trial, so let's stick to the evidence that I heard at trial." (R. at
001646:1219).
The testimony of Randy Butler coupled with at least 23 witnesses who testified at
trial that a gate was installed on the Road and locked, which prevented access unless they
obtained permission from the Butlers was sufficient to meet Utah County's burden of
production. The burden of production then shifted to the Butlers, who failed to establish
the days, if any, from July 29,1997 through trial that the gate across the Road was
unlocked.
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D.

After Considering the Entire Record the Trial Court Should Have
Determined with Reasonable Precision the Number of Days that the Gate
Was Locked in Violation of Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104(4)(B).

Notwithstanding the above argument, had the trial court considered the entire
record, then it should have determined with reasonable precision the number of days that
the gate was locked in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104(4)(B).
There was another piece of evidence in the record, which the trial court failed to
consider. It was a letter from Randy Butler to former Utah County Commissioner Gary L.
Herbert, dated December 9, 2002, in which Mr. Butler set forth with reasonable precision
the amount of days that he left the gate unlocked. (R. at 001647: Plaintiffs Exhibit No.
4). See Addendum. In that letter, Mr. Butler states that "In October of 2001, we agreed
to allow access for the hunts. That fall Utah County put up a sign on the gate that stated it
was private property to the U.S. Forest Service Land. We left the gate unlocked for
approximately 30 days
incident

We locked the gate again until August 20, 2002 without

Consequently, I locked the gate on October 24, 2002, and as of December 1,

2002, there has not been any problem." (R. at 001647: Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 4). See
Addendum.
In accordance with that letter from Randy Butler to former Utah County
Commissioner Gary L. Herbert, dated December 9, 2002, it is clear that the periods of
time when the gate was unlocked consisting of approximately 30 days in October 2001
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and from August 20, 2002 to October 24, 2002 (66 days), for a total of 96 days. There is
no additional evidence that the gate across the Road was ever unlocked.
Considering Randy Butler's testimony at trial, the testimony of at least 23 other
witnesses who testified that a gate was installed on the Road and locked, and the letter
from Mr. Butler dated December 9, 2002, the trial court was clearly erroneous by not
determining with reasonable precision the number of days that the gate across the Road
was locked.
IX.

THE BUTLERS' OFFERED EVIDENCE WAS DEFICIENT TO NEGATE THE
$10 PER DAY PENALTY PROSCRIBED IN UTAH CODE ANN. § 72-7-104.
The Butlers presented two items in an attempt to negate the $10 per day penalty.

These two items consisted of a "Notice of Public Hearing" and a sign placed on the gate
across the Road by Utah County. However, these two items were deficient to negate the
$10 per day penalty proscribed in Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104.
A.

The "Notice of Public Hearing" as Evidence.

The first item presented by the Butlers was Exhibit No. 83, which was disallowed
by the trial court. (R. at 001645:1122-1130).
However, the Butlers was successful, by stipulation, in introducing into evidence
Exhibit No. 84 which purports to provide notice of a public hearing held on February 11,
2003. (R. at 001645:1126-1128). The "Notice of Public Hearing" provides "Notice of
Intention of the Board of County Commissioners of Utah County, Utah to Amend the
Official Map Ordinance of Utah County, Utah, Part A, by Deleting, Adding, and Re37

aligning Certain Roads and Notice of a Public Hearing to Consider Said Amendment."
As it relates to the Road, the "Notice of Public Hearing" provides "Add to Bennie Creek
Road (from 3523 East 16962 South to 1223 East 16043 South) Sec. 20, 21, 22, 26 & 27
T10SR3E" as a class "B" county road. (R. at 001648:84)
Randy Butler testified that he attended that February 11, 2003 Utah County
Commission Meeting and that the Road was discussed. Mr. Butler further testified that
the Road was not designated as a county road at that meeting. (R. at 001645:1127-1128).
During closing argument, counsel for the Butlers commented that "the County to date has
not designated that road as a county road." (R. at 001646:1215).
Contrasted with the testimony of Randy Butler is the testimony of Clyde Naylor.
Mr. Naylor testified that he is the County Engineer, County Surveyor, and Public Works
Director. Mr. Naylor further testified that Utah County has entered into a number of
agreements with the Forest Service for maintenance of the Road (R. at 001639:86-98;
Exhibit Nos. 50, 52-58). These agreements with the Forest Service go back to as early as
January 8, 1974. (R. at 001639:86). Mr. Naylor also testified of a number of general
highway maps of Utah County depicting the Road as a class D road. (R. at 001639:98110, 114; Exhibit Nos. 60, 62-66). These maps go back to as early as 1955. (R. at
001639:101).
As a result of the testimony of Clyde Naylor, it is evident that Utah County has
considered the Road as a class D county road since at least as early as 1955. In each of
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the aforementioned maps and agreements, the Road is so designated as a class D county
road. Clearly, the weight of evidence demonstrates that Utah County has so designated
the Road as a class D county road.
B.

The Sign Installed by Utah County as Evidence.

The second item introduced by the Butlers was Exhibit No. 80-C, which was a
picture of a sign. Utah County stipulated that it put the sign on the closed gate. (R. at
001645:1139-1140; 001648:80-C). The sign reads "Keep Gate Closed Private Property to
Forest Service Boundary No Trespassing Off Road." (R. at 001648:80-C). Utah County
merely installed this sign to be a good neighbor and to instruct the public to stay on the
Road.
Neither the "Notice of Public Hearing" nor the sign are evidence that the Road is a
private road. Likewise, neither the "Notice of Public Hearing" nor the sign are evidence
that Utah County allowed the Butlers to install a gate across the Road. Therefore, the trial
court properly ignored these two items offered by the Butlers.
CONCLUSION
Based on the forgoing, and on the brief of Appellee State of Utah, Division of
Wildlife Resources, Plaintiff/Appellee/Cross Appellant Utah County respectfully
requests:
1. That the Court uphold the decision of the trial court which determined that the
Bennie Creek Road is a public thoroughfare and dismiss Appellants' appeal,
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2. That the Court reverse the trial court and order that Utah County is entitled to
judgement against Defendants Butler for a penalty of $10.00 for each day that the gate
remained in the Bennie Creek Road right of way after service of the Notice to remove the
same, or in the alternative, for $10.00 for each day the gate remained locked across the
Bennie Creek Road after service of the Notice to remove the same.
3. For Plaintiffs costs on appeal and cross appeal.
4. For such further relief as is just and equitable in the premises.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 19th day of September, 2005.

M. CORT GRIFFIN
ROBERT J. MOORE
Deputy Utah County Attorneys

40

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I hand delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing
APPELLEE'S BRIEF, on this 19th day of September, 2005, to the following:
SCOTT L. WIGGINS
Arnold & Wiggins, P.C.
57 West 200 South #105
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
MARTIN B. BUSHMAN
Assistant Attorney General
Utah Attorney General's Office
1594 West North Temple, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116
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ADDENDUM

72-7-104.

Installations constructed in violation of rules - Rights of highway
authorities to remove or require removal.

(1)
If any person, firm, or corporation installs, places, constructs, alters, repairs,
or maintains any approach road, driveway, pole, pipeline, conduit, sewer, ditch, culvert,
outdoor advertising sign, or any other structure or object of any kind or character within
the right-of-way of any highway without complying with this title, the highway authority
having jurisdiction over the right-of-way may:
(a)
remove the installation from the right-of-way or require the person,
firm, or corporation to remove the installation; or
(b)
give written notice to the person, firm, or corporation to remove the
installation from the right-of-way.
(2)
Notice under Subsection (l)(b) may be served by:
(a)
personal service; or
(b) (i) mailing the notice to the person, firm, or corporation by certified
mail; and
(ii) posting a copy on the installation for ten days.
(3)
If the installation is not removed within ten days after the notice is
complete, the highway authority may remove the installation at the expense of the person,
firm, or corporation.
(4)
A highway authority may recover:
(a)
The costs and expense incurred in removing the installation, serving
notice, and the costs of a lawsuit if any; and
(b)
$ 10 for each day the installation remained within the right-of-way
after notice was complete.
(5)
(a)
If the person, firm, or corporation disputes or denies the existence,
placement, construction, or maintenance of the installation, or refuses to
remove or permit its removal, the highway authority may bring an action to
abate the installation as a public nuisance.
(b)
If the highway authority is granted a judgment, the highway authority
may recover the costs of having the public nuisance abated as provided in
Subsection (4).
(6)
The department, its agents, or employees, if acting in good faith, incur no
liability for causing removal of an installation within a right-of-way of a highway as
provided in this section.
(7)
The actions of the department under this section are not subject to the
provisions of Title 63, Chapter 46b, the Administrative Procedures Act.

17-3-1-1. Enforcement
If any person places, constructs, or maintains any approach road, driveway, pole,
pipeline, conduit, sewer, ditch, culvert, billboard, advertising sign, or any other structure
or object of any kind of character within the right-of-way of any county road, without first
obtaining permission from the Board of County Commissioners, the Commissioners may:
(a)
remove such installation from the right-of-way or require such person to
remove the same; or
(b)
give written notice to such person to remove such installation from the
right-of-way; such notice may be served either by personal service or by
mailing the notice to the person by registered mail and posting a copy
thereof on such installation for a period often (10) days; and if such
installation is not removed within ten (10) days after the notice is complete,
the Commission may remove the same at the expense of the person and
recover costs and expenses, and also the sum often dollars ($10.00) for
each day the same remained within the right-of-way after notice was
complete, in an action for that purpose; or,
(c)
if such person disputes or denies the existence of such installation, or
refuses to remove or permit its removal, the Commission may bring an
action to abate the same as a nuisance; and if judgment is recovered, in
addition to having the same abated, the costs of action and the sum often
dollars ($10.00) for every day such nuisance remained within the right-ofway after notice was given for its removal in the manner provided in
Subsection (b) of this Section.

December 9, 2002

TO: Gxnr&ssioner Herbert
FROM: Randy Butler & Blaine Evans
BE:

Bennie Cre£k Road

Gary, the following is a c&ronological list ofroostof the problems that have
occurred. I appreciate your villingness to review this matter*
From 1987 to 1993, ve had 7 cattle shot, 3 calves stolen, our truck taken on
2 occasions and our bac&hoe taken once* Our fences have been cut in numerous
places and at numerous times* People drive through the pastures vhile they are
being irrigated, creating deep ruts that create erosion. The lodes or drains
have been cut on the gates leading into our pastures on 4 occasions. 1 caught
one of these individuals and he said he didnft know it vas private property.
When he had to pass 4 private property:* and/or ho trespassing signs and had to
cut the chain to get access to where ha vas.
W ^ v e had people come at 3:00 a.m., built a fire in our front yard and rode
snowiaobiles up and down the road all morning. lEbey chased a cougar, caught it,
killed it and never left posted private property I
During this time, there vere many tiroes(alroost weekly) that there vas a drug
and/or alcohol party either on private posted property or on the U.S. Forest.
We could not let our own ciiildren cainp on our own property for fear of what
could happen. We vould pic3c up beer cans, syringes, clothing and even
mattresses after they vould leave.
During this time, law enforcement responded one time, the vere called 4 times.
In 1993, ve started restricting access, first vith a rope and a sign across the
road, thai a diain for 2 years and finally the gate that presently exists.
From 1994 to 2001, ve required people to sign penqission slips to gain access.
During this time, ve*ve had many instances vtere people vould try to drive
ttaxwgh our bac&yard* One individual drove over our sprinikler pipes. He
called the sheriff but no one ever responded. He also had the incident X
mentioned to you. About a Mr. Kent t&ooa threatening my wife's life.
In October of 2001, ve agreed to allow access for the hunts. That fall Utah
County put tip a sign on the gate that stated it vas private property \x> the
U.S. Forest Service I£nd. We left the gate unlocked for approximately 30 days.
In vhicii time, ve fed three different groups in our pastures that ve caught
and 2 on the Evans1 Property. . No law enforcement ever responded in any of these
cases. We lotiked the gate again until August 20, 2002 without incident.

Since August 20, 2002, the following problems have occurred. Remember, this is
while the gate is unlocked. The gate between the Howell's Property and the U.S.
Forest Service has been left open twice. This gate is k mile north of the
Bennie Creek Road and it has never been a problem before. The fence between the
Evan's Property and the U.S. Forest Service has been cut and the gate left open
in the same area.
Countless people have ridden ATVTs through private property and the forest
property, which would be fine except we get the blame for it. On 2 occasions,
there have been people on ATV's in the middle of the night riding around in our
pastures. We have caught people trespassing twice, called law enforceiaent and
had ho response.
On many occasions, the signs on the gates and fences got shot numerous times.
A new electric fence controller vas shot as well as the private property sign
next to it. Our kitchen window was shot with a bullet going through the
kitchen , ricocheting off the inside door and into the pantry. As well as
another hole in the vail just below the window. The signs on the gate that is
approximately 75 feet from our home were shot again.
Consequently, I locked the gate on October 24, 2002, and as of December 1, 2002,
there has not been any problem. I also have dates and times for most of these
occurrences if they are needed.
Gary, I appreciate your time in reviewing this matter. I hope it can be resolved.
fcMon't think the County wants this liability anymore than we do.
Thank You

P.S; Would you please let me know of the financial feasibility concerning this
matter A.S.A.P.. Also I have enclosed a list of additional stipulations that
should help with the problems ve discussed the other day.

Respectfully,

Blaine Evans

cc:
Mark Arnold

STIPULATIONS

# 1. Utah County vill provide a lav enforcement officer on Friday and Saturday
nights from 4:00 p.m. until 10:00 p.m. from April 15th to November 15th.
This vould help eliminate the veekend parties and some of the vandalism*
# 2. When the property owners call for a trespass or a vandalism violation, the
Utah County Sheriff's Department vill respond vithin 45 minutes maxiimm.
# 3. Utah County Public Works vill install a new bridge over Thistle Creek*
The existing bridge is not safe or designed for large fire trucks. If ve
are going to increase the traffic, ve should bring the bridge up to county
specifications to carry a minimum of 86,000 lb.
# 4. Utah County should agree to pave the existing county road from Hwy 89 to
the gate by the Butlerfs hone. This should be done to stop the dust
problem that is created by the increase in traffic and to eliminate the
need to grade and maintain the road*
# 5. Utah County, the Division of Wildlife Resources and the U.S. Forest Service
should open all other accesses t6 the Nebo Mountain and the I/oafer Mountain
area to the public. Especially, • the Crab Creek area and the Salt Hollow or
gas line road. As veil as the Dream Mine and Covered Bridge roads. This
vould equally distribute the publics use and not concentrate it only to
Bennie Cteek.
# 6 . We agreed to a 16 feet Right-Of-Way not an 18 feet RightrOf-Way. Therefore,
ve vould propose that Utah County install a fence cm both sides of the RightOf-Way. Eight feet from the center of the road all the vay through the
private property. This vould clearly define the Right-OMfey and should
discourage people from trespassing• Also, Utah County should maintain said
fence as it is their Right-Of-Way.
# 7. Utah County should install and maintain at least one surveillance camera at
or near the existing gate.
# 8. The road is not a county road and should not appear as sucii on the county
road maps in order to avoid confusion in the future*
# 9. tee plaintiffs should be financially responsible for the defendants loss due
to the public use of this road. Suck as livestock shot or 6tolen, signs, gat
fences, vater control devices* equipment or homes that are shot, stolen or
damaged. The defendantsfehouldbe reimbursed the fair maxfcet value as such
vithin 60 days or they can locac the gate to eliminate the risk of additional
vandalism.
#10. The agreesaent may be amended as the need arises and as negotiated by both
parties in order to avoid court action.
#11. During seasonal road closures, the public use vill be at the defendants
discretion. ~ (There may be late season hunts for certain species of animals
that ve vould like to have harvested)
#12. If the plaintiffs breach the agreement, they should loose their Right-0f-Wc
(Otherwise, they vould have no incentive to abide by this agreement).
One other solution that vould be the preference of all the land owners is to hav
Utah County abandon the entire road, allow us to put in a gate similar to Oovere
Bridget and allow us to maintain the road at our own costs rather than paying c
costs as has been the case for the last 7 years. As for the most pa*tr v& "have
repaired , graded and otherwise maintained the road in the past as it is.
Respectfully,

** NOTICE **
TO:

Randy Butler
Donna Butler
2721 East 17050 South
Birdseye, UT 84629

DATE:

July 18,1997

Pursuant to Utah County Ordinance 17-3-1-1 and Utah Code Annotated 27-12-135, a person
may not place, construct or maintain any pole or any other structure or object of any kind or
character within the right-of-way of any County road or highway without the permission of the
Board of Utah County Commissioners. You have, without the permission of the Utah County Board
of Commissioners, placed a gate across the Bennie Creek Road, which is a County road under Utah
County Ordinance 17-1-1.
You are hereby given notice to remove from the Bennie Creek Road any and all poles,
structures or objects of any kind or character placed, constructed or maintained by you within the
right-of-way of the Bennie Creek Road, including, but not limited to, any gates placed thereon by
you.
If, within ten(10) days of service of this notice on you, you fail to remove from the Bennie
Creek Road any and all gates, poles, structures or objects of any kind or character placed,
constructed or maintained by you within the Bennie Creek Road right-of-way, the Utah County
Commission may remove the same at your expense and recover costs and expenses from you
including the sum of $10.00 for each day the same remains within the Bennie Creek Road right-ofway after this notice was served upon you or bring an action to abate the same as a nuisance. If
judgement is recovered by the Commission, the Commission may also recover in the addition to
having the same abated the costs of action and the sum of $10.00 for every day such nuisance
remained in the Bennie Creek Road right-of-way after service of this notice upon you.
Govern yourself accordingly.

""^-/dfi
David J. Gardner, Chairman,
Utah County Board of Commissioners
MCG:tae
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UTAH COUNTY SHERIFF'S
DOCKET NUMBER: CV-97-2510
PLAINTIFF:

PROCESS:

OFFICE

NOTICE

UTAH COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS

vs
DEFENDANT: BUTLER,
ATTORNEY:
COURT:

RANDY

UTAH COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS

COURT IS

DATE RECEIVED:

NOT NEED

DEPUTY: RICHARD CASE

7/22/1997

TIME ENTERED:

CHARGE DESCRIPTION

AMOUNT

TOTAL:
HOME ADDRESS:

2721

E 17050

7/29/1997

DATE RETURNED:

PAID

0.00
SOUTH

BIRDSEYE
DATE SERVED:

1043

UT

TIME SERVED:

17:30

84629
ATTEMPTS TO SERVE:

7/30/1997

COMMENTS: DO NOT POST!
SERVED HEIDI BUTLER /DAUGHTER

* * * * *

CHECK FOR POSSIBLE

WARRANT

* * * * *

1

KETUKJN VF

SERVICE

STATE OF UTAH / COUNTY OF UTAH } S.S. SHERIFF'S OFFICE
DOCKET NUMBER: CV-97-2510
SERVED:

BUTLER, RANDY

DATE RECEIVED:

7/22/1997

DEFENDANT
DATE SERVED: 7/29/1997

PROCESS: NOTICE
TYPE OF SERVICE: OTHER
LEFT AT RESIDENCE WITH: HEIDI BUTLER
HIS/HER RELATIONSHIP IS: DAUGHTER
AND THIS IS HIS/HER PLACE OF ABODE AND IS OF SUITABLE AGE AND DISCRETION.
SERVICE ADDRESS: 2721 E 17050 SOUTH
CITY: BIRDSEYE

STATE: UT

I FURTHER CERTIFY THAT AT THE TIME OF SERVICE, ON COPY SERVED,
I ENDORSED THE DATE, SIGNED MY NAME AND OFFICIAL TITLE THERETO.

SHERIFF'S FEES
TOTAL

.0.00

DAVID R. BATEMAN, SHERIFF OF UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
I CERTIFY THAT THE FORGOING IS TRUE AND CORRECT
AND THAT THIS CERTIFICATE IS EXECUTED ON

DATE

7/3 0/1997 BY

** NOTICE **
TO:

Randy Butler
Donna Butler
2721 East 17050 South
Birdseye, UT 84629

DATE:

July 18, 1997

Pursuant to Utah County Ordinance 17-3-1-1 and Utah Code Annotated 27-12-135, a person
may not place, construct or maintain any pole or any other structure or object of any kind or
character within the right-of-way of any County road or highway without the permission of the
Board of Utah County Commissioners. You have, without the permission of the Utah County Board
of Commissioners, placed a gate across the Bennie Creek Road, which is a County road under Utah
County Ordinance 17-1-1.
You are hereby given notice to remove from the Bennie Creek Road any and all poles,
structures or objects of any kind or character placed, constructed or maintained by you within the
right-of-way of the Bennie Creek Road, including, but not limited to, any gates placed thereon by
you.
If, within ten(10) days of service of this notice on you, you fail to remove from the Bennie
Creek Road any and all gates, poles, structures or objects of any kind or character placed,
constructed or maintained by you within the Bennie Creek Road right-of-way, the Utah County
Commission may remove the same at your expense and recover costs and expenses from you
including the sum of $10.00 for each day the same remains within the Bennie Creek Road right-ofway after this notice was served upon you or bring an action to abate the same as a nuisance. If
judgement is recovered by the Commission, the Commission may also recover in the addition to
having the same abated the costs of action and the sum of $10.00 for every day such nuisance
remained in the Bennie Creek Road right-of-way after service of this notice upon you.
Govern yourself accordingly.

~^^^.(£i
David J. Gardner, Chairman,
Utah County Board of Commissioners
MCG:tae
U>COrnr8LCWK3\8TUUiOT

UTAH

DOCKET NUMBER: C V - 9 7 - 2 5 1 1
PLAINTIFF:

UUUNTX

PROCESS:

SHERIFF'S

OFFICE

NOTICE

UTAH COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS

vs
DEFENDANT: BUTLER,
ATTORNEY:
COURT:

DONNA

UTAH COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS

COURT IS

DATE RECEIVED:

NOT NEED

DEPUTY: RICHARD CASE

7/22/1997

TIME ENTERED:

CHARGE DESCRIPTION

AMOUNT

TOTAL:
HOME ADDRESS:

2721

E 17050

7/29/1997

DATE RETURNED:

SOUTH
UT

TIME SERVED:

17:30

84629
ATTEMPTS TO SERVE:

7/30/1997

COMMENTS: DO NOT POST!
SERVED HEIDI

* * * * *

PAID

0.00

BIRDSEYE
DATE SERVED:

1043

BUTLER/DAUGHTER

CHECK FOR POSSIBLE

WARRANT

* * * * *

1

STATE

OF UTAH /

COUNTY OF UTAH }

DOCKET NUMBER:
SERVED:

SHERIFF'S

BUTLER,

DONNA

DEFENDANT

7/22/1997

DATE SERVED:

7/29/1997

NOTICE

TYPE OF SERVICE:

OTHER

LEFT AT RESIDENCE WITH:
HEIDI BUTLER
HIS/HER RELATIONSHIP
IS:
DAUGHTER
AND THIS IS HIS/HER PLACE OF ABODE AND IS
SERVICE

OFFICE

CV-97-25II

DATE RECEIVED:
PROCESS:

S.S.

ADDRESS:
CITY:

2721 E 17050
BIRDSEYE

OF SUITABLE AGE AND

SOUTH
STATE:

UT

I FURTHER CERTIFY THAT AT THE TIME OF SERVICE,
ON COPY SERVED,
I ENDORSED THE DATE, SIGNED MY NAME AND OFFICIAL TITLE THERETO.

SHERIFF'S

FEES

TOTAL
DAVID R.

BATEMAN,

SHERIFF

0.00
OF UTAH COUNTY,

STATE OF UTAH

I CERTIFY THAT THE FORGOING IS TRUE AND CORRECT
AND THAT THIS CERTIFICATE
IS EXECUTED ON

DATE 7/30/1997 BY

fcl&f^/jtfKj

C 6 f 4 CL>
' RICHARD CASE

DISCRETION.

